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The combination of rapidly increasing trade openness with
sharp exchange-rate appreciation formed the context in which
Argentine industry had to carry out its production restructuring
process from 1991 on. The inability of the spontaneous market
forces to spark off this process led the Argentine government to
adopt a number of measures designed to correct the problem of
relative prices and further the restructuring process through fiscal
means. In this context, the Industrial Specialization Regime
(ISR) was established with the main objective of promoting ex-
port specialization by industrial firms. This regime was based on
a subsidy for incremental exports which took the form of access
at preferential tariff rates to the importation of goods similar to
those exported or forming part of a given production chain of
complex goods. The aim of the present article is to make a theo-
retical and empirical analysis of this policy instrument (in its
dual dimension of restructuring policy and export subsidy), ex-
amining its underlying theoretical bases, questions relating to its
design, application and control, and finally, its effects on the in-
dustrial sector.









As from the early 1990s, the Argentine government
simultaneously applied a macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion plan and a broad-ranging structural reform pro-
cess, including in particular rapid and indiscriminate
trade openness. At the same time, the turnaround in
international capital flows and the rapid growth of
expenditure (especially of consumer goods) fostered
by those flows were reflected in strong exchange rate
appreciation.
Faithful to the principles of the Washington
Consensus, the policy-making authorities trusted im-
plicitly that the spontaneous action of the market
forces would bring about the necessary adjustments
both at the macroeconomic level (deflation of nomi-
nal prices) and in terms of resource allocation (devel-
opment of sectors with comparative advantages,
generalized increases in productivity).
The conversion process did not take place either
as completely or as promptly as expected, however.
The trade balance quickly became negative, and the
deficit began to increase without respite. The
tradeables sectors of the economy (especially textiles
and clothing, footwear and capital goods) were sub-
jected to strong competition due to the combination
of trade openness and a low exchange rate.
Towards the end of 1992 this situation became
unsustainable and the Argentine government began
to apply a series of measures aimed at correcting the
problem of relative prices by fiscal means and fur-
thering the restructuring process. Firstly, the trade
openness process was partially reversed by raising
the duty on imports from 3% to 10% and applying
various para-tariff measures (specific duties, quotas,
etc.). Secondly, the real effective export exchange
rates were raised by increasing the export drawbacks
and reducing some taxes affecting the tradeables sec-
tor (including employers’ contributions).
Lastly, the government set aside its ul-
tra-orthodox attitude and launched a number of trade
and industrial policy programmes designed to facili-
tate the production restructuring process. The main
pillars of this new industrial policy were measures to
make the incorporation of capital goods less expen-
sive and promote production specialization. For the
first of these objectives, a new capital goods policy
was introduced which combined the elimination of
tariffs with drawbacks for local producers of capital
goods,1 together with interest rate subsidy arrange-
ments to help finance the acquisition of capital goods
by small and medium-sized enterprises.
In pursuit of the second of these objectives, the
Industrial Specialization Regime (ISR) was estab-
lished, with provisions that were similar (although
they offered fewer benefits) to those of the Argentine
Automotive Regime. Until it was suspended in Au-
gust 1996, this programme became one of the main-
stays of the industrial policy applied under Minister
of the Economy Domingo Cavallo.
The general aim of the ISR may be defined as the
promotion of a sequence of economic processes: spe-
cialization in the production of a more limited num-
ber of goods by each enterprise (reduction of the
variety of products entering into their manufacture)
→ exploitation of economies of scale and organiza-
tion of work → reduction of costs → increased com-
petitiveness on domestic and international markets
→ greater linkages in international trade → access to
new technologies.2
In contrast with its multiplicity of objectives and
aims, the ISR provided for only one incentive: a sub-
sidy for additional exports operating in the form of
access with preferential tariffs to the importation of
goods similar to those exported or forming part of
the same chain of production of complex goods.3
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1 For a critical analysis of this capital goods policy, see Sirlin,
1997a.
2 In the preambular paragraphs of the measure setting up the
ISR these objectives were set out in a disordered and disjointed
manner.
3 This form of incentive is similar to that provided under the Ar-
gentine Automotive Regime (the only instrument of a sectoral
nature kept in being by the new economic authorities), and in its
propaganda for the new regime the government asserted that it
represented the generalization of the special treatment already
being given to the motor industry. There are substantial differ-
ences between the two regimes, however. Although the motor
industry also enjoys heavy protection through import quotas,
it is required to enter into specific commitments in terms of
investment and organization of production which are not
demanded in the ISR.
The purpose of this article is to make a theoreti-
cal and empirical examination of this policy instru-
ment (in its dual dimension of restructuring policy
and export subsidy) and analyse its theoretical bases,
issues connected with its design, application and
control, and its effects on the industrial sector. Even
though the ISR is no longer in effect, we consider its
critical analysis essential in order to help to improve
the capacity for the design, execution and control of
industrial policy in general.
In section II below we will study the theoreti-
cal bases for production specialization incentives
and export subsidies in general, demonstrating
also how the design and form of implementation
of such policies vary considerably depending on
the general conception of industrial policy held
by the authorities. Section III describes the fea-
tures of the Argentine Industrial Specialization
Regime and analyses the extent to which it is in
line with the theoretical grounds set forth in the
preceding section. Section IV makes an appraisal
of the impact that the ISR had on industry in its
first three years of existence, and section V pres-
ents the main conclusions.
II
Export subsidies and incentives for industrial
conversion and production specialization:
grounds, benefits and costs
1. Production specialization
The aim of the ISR was to bring about the restructur-
ing of industrial enterprises through their specializa-
tion in more specific aspects of production. The first
question that arises is why, if production specializa-
tion is considered to be so efficient, it is not induced
spontaneously by the market forces. In other words,
what are the flaws in the market or the regulations
that lead to vertical integration and lack of produc-
tion specialization?
In order to answer these questions we must draw
a distinction between what we might call “efficient”
and “non-efficient” determinants of company deci-
sions on the structure of production, that is to say,
distinguish between those cases where non-special-
ization is due to a desire for the microeconomic opti-
mization of production processes and those where it
is the result of distortions that affect the efficiency of
production and call for the application of corrective
policies.
Among the efficient determinants are those pro-
duction processes in which the production functions
determine the existence of economies of non-differ-
entiation. As well as those deriving from the produc-
tion function in the strict sense, this kind of
economies may also be seen as coming from the
indivisibilities and economies of scale existing in
other activities of the enterprise in question, such as
the design, transport and marketing of goods and the
exploitation of trade marks. In all these cases, pro-
duction specialization does not improve microeco-
nomic efficiency.
The non-efficient determinants of company deci-
sions on production structure, for their part, may be
due to inappropriate price signals or microeconomic
adaptation to highly unstable macroeconomic con-
texts or inefficient legal systems.
Macroeconomic instability encourages excessive
vertical integration because the agents try to mini-
mize the transaction costs implicit in a more special-
ized production system supplemented with outside
subcontracting.4 Furthermore, it is noted in the
abundant literature on institutions that when property
rights are not clearly specified and protected, agents
tend to refrain from carrying out all the contracts and
specific investments required by a more specialized
production structure (North, 1993; Williamson,
1994).
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4 With regard to the interaction between macroeconomic imbal-
ances and patterns of microeconomic behaviour, see Fanelli and
Frenkel, 1994.
Inappropriate price signals may also be due to
distortions induced by the public sector or to market
flaws. The main (although not the only) source of
erroneous price signals is the existence of an anti-
export bias.
When domestic demand for a good is saturated,
this gives rise to the option between extending the
company’s field of operations to the external market
or embarking on horizontal expansion by broadening
the structure of production and occupying new do-
mestic market niches (Katz, 1993). The existence of
an anti-export bias creates an environment in which
it is more attractive to sell products on the domestic
market and encourages horizontal expansion strate-
gies which lead to excessive diversification of the
product structure.
Such a bias is due to:
i) Trade policy instruments (tariff and para-tariff
measures) which raise the effective import exchange
rate above the effective export exchange rate.
ii) Tariff dispersion, when this tends to protect
sectors with comparative disadvantages. Even if it
tries to offset the tariffs for each good with export
subsidies, a tariff structure of this type gives rise to
an anti-export bias, because by discouraging the im-
portation of goods in which the country has compar-
ative disadvantages it tends to depress the real
equilibrium exchange rate.5
iii) Regulatory and tax measures which involve
the export of taxes and extra costs and which operate,
in practice, as export taxes.
iv) The differential impact of market shortcom-
ings. Thus, the shortcomings in terms of information
and the credit market encountered in export opera-
tions are usually much greater than those faced by
companies in their sales on the domestic market
(Bekerman and Sirlin, 1995).
It may also be wondered how far export subsi-
dies represent the most suitable way of correcting or
eliminating the non-efficient factors that adversely
affect company decisions on production specializa-
tion.
The classical response of second-best theory is
that the optimal approach to these problems involves
attacking them at their source (Corden, 1978): i.e.,
stabilizing the economy at the macro level, expedit-
ing the functioning of the legal system, eliminating
distortive policies (such as trade protection), and de-
veloping optimal industrial policies (assistance in the
areas of finance and information) which correct mar-
ket flaws that affect export activities. When this is
not possible in the short term, or when the distortive
policies nevertheless act as second-best instruments
for solving other market flaws, export subsidies may
be used to reduce the implicit social costs.6
In turn, these subsidies should have some degree
of sectoral selectivity, for when the anti-export bias
in question is generated by extra costs due to taxes or
tariffs the rates of subsidy should reflect the
sectorally differentiated impact of those costs.
An export subsidy which seeks to offset an
anti-export bias generated by market flaws should
also have some degree of selectivity, determined in
this case by the nature of the flaws in question.
It can thus be asserted that export subsidies should be
concentrated in the sectors producing the most differ-
entiated goods (which are those facing most short-
comings in terms of information) and in small and
medium-sized enterprises (because the economies of
scale inherent in the collection of information and
the commercial and financial management of ex-
port operations make the export efforts of these
firms even more complicated). Furthermore, some
of these extra costs act as (individual and sectoral)
barriers to entry into export activities rather than as
permanent extra costs. This means that the in-
centives should give priority attention to sectors
with the least export tradition and should also go
down with time.
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5 This is none other than an example of the application of
Lerner’s well-known symmetry theory, whereby - in a general
equilibrium context - import duties operate in a manner equiva-
lent to export taxes. Several heterodox studies on the Southeast
Asian experience (such as those by Wade, 1990, or Amsden,
1989) fail to take account of this question when they claim,
without further clarifications, that the governments in that re-
gion simultaneously promoted exports and import substitution
in different industries (Rodrick, 1995).
6 The difference between trade protection which is not offset by
export subsidies and trade protection which is offset in this way
has been described by Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970) as the
difference between mere protection and true industrial promo-
tion. This conceptual distinction is of fundamental importance
for understanding the very different results obtained by the out-
ward-looking industrialization policies of the Southeast Asian
countries and the inward-looking industrialization policies
adopted by many Latin American countries.
It would also be desirable to investigate the pos-
sible effects of the particular form assumed by export
subsidies in the ISR, that is to say, the tariff reduc-
tions for the imports of the firms involved.7
A typical export subsidy has a neutral effect as
regards promoting production complementarity
(through specialization by the firm) with other local
or foreign firms. The export subsidy through tariff
reductions, in contrast, gives rise to an artificial bias
in favour of complementation with foreign firms.
In other words, firms have more incentives to spe-
cialize and complement their production with im-
ported inputs than with local inputs. This bias can be
a source of serious inefficiencies, not only because it
constitutes yet another distortion in resource alloca-
tion but also because it runs counter to one of the
most important factors of systemic competitiveness:
strengthening local production chains and local sub-
contracting networks.
On the other hand, subsidies through special tar-
iff reductions give rise to further anarchy in the ef-
fective sectoral protection structure.8
2. Export subsidies
Although the ISR was presented as an industrial pol-
icy instrument designed to promote the restructuring
of production, its main raison d’être was really to
correct the distortion in relative prices which existed
in the economy as a result of the increase in the ef-
fective export exchange rate. For this reason, it is de-
sirable when analysing this policy to make a global
study of the different theoretical grounds for the use
of export subsidies.
The arguments in favour of the use of export
subsidies are along two main lines, one micro-
economic and the other macroeconomic. The
microeconomic line is based on general equilibrium
models in which it is assumed, at least implicitly,
that adjustment mechanisms through prices (in this
case, the real exchange rate) make it possible to
exclude the coordination failures of an aggregate
nature which are reflected in unwanted global trade
balances. Attention is thus concentrated exclusively
on questions of allocation.
The first and most important case is that of the
use of export subsidies as a way of offsetting an
anti-export bias. A second justification of a microec-
onomic nature for export subsidies may be drawn
from the arguments highlighting the advantages of a
bias in favour of trade. The reasons for such an ex-
tension of subsidy policy to exports lie in the exter-
nalities generated by greater integration of world
trade. Prominent among them is the possibility of se-
curing a greater inflow of technology, and especially
of “soft” technologies, since export activities implic-
itly involve learning processes in terms of quality
control, design capability and packaging, which sub-
sequently spread to the domestic market through the
influence of improvements in locally sold products,
and the dissemination of these new technologies to
the rest of the production apparatus through relations
with suppliers. As these externalities are very impor-
tant in the initial stages of an export model –which
is when enterprises must embark on the process of
productive and organizational restructuring– export
subsidies justified on these grounds must also be of a
transitory nature.
A third microeconomic argument may be found
in new international trade theory. In the models
based on this theory,9 export subsidies are supposed
to allow local enterprises to make greater gains than
would normally be possible in international markets
with high degrees of concentration and serious entry
barriers. Although this argument would hardly be ap-
plicable to underdeveloped countries (which do not
have big enough enterprises to enter into strategic
competition for markets with foreign firms), compe-
tition within a regional market may be very impor-
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7 The main advantage of a system like this is really its lower vis-
ibility as a subsidy, in view of possible complaints from outside
(e.g., from the WTO or the United States Government). There is
also another advantage from the government’s point of view:
the ISR did not involve actual outlays of public money but only
the sacrifice of some tariff revenue (Magariños, Díaz Pérez and
Sierra, 1995). Although of dubious conceptual validity, this ad-
vantage must be understood in the context of the pressures to re-
duce public expenditure exerted by the international agencies
and incorporated in the so-called Washington Consensus.
8 While at the same time liquidating the tariff preferences
granted under MERCOSUR and thereby allowing Brazil to
strengthen its bargaining position in other problem areas (such
as the automotive regime, para-tariff restrictions, etc.).
9 A good summary of these arguments may be found in Brander,
1987.
tant (Bekerman and Sirlin, 1994). In these cases the
subsidies must be highly selective and suitably mea-
sured in the light of the particular characteristics of
each market.10
All these arguments are posited within a theoret-
ical framework based on general equilibrium princi-
ples in which the real exchange rate adjusts
spontaneously to its equilibrium level, the trade bal-
ance is determined exclusively by macroeconomic
variables, and a reduction in imports due to trade
protection or an increase in exports brought about by
subsidies cause an appreciation in the real exchange
rate which leaves the trade balance unchanged.11
We believe, however, that imbalances of a global
nature (and their interaction with microeconomic
policy instruments) are too important in theory and
practice to be left out of the analysis. Here there
are two major arguments that justify the use of ex-
port subsidies as a complement to macroeconomic
policies.
Firstly, there may be rigidities which prevent
relative prices (such as the real exchange rate) from
adjusting to their equilibrium values. In an extreme
case of rigidity, adjustment to negative external
shocks is reflected in changes in the level of domes-
tic activity (or compensatory capital movements). In
this context, the discussion goes beyond the sphere
of the allocation effects of trade policy to include the
more general problem of the degree of utilization of
production resources. Expenditure reform policies
(such as import tariffs and export subsidies) recover
their macroeconomic effectiveness in this case, for
these instruments make it possible either to raise the
local level of activity in view of the level of external
imbalance or to correct that imbalance while leaving
the level of domestic activity unchanged. They thus
become second-best instruments for correcting mac-
roeconomic relative price problems (Bekerman and
Sirlin, 1995).
Secondly, specific interactions can be established
between real flows and financial flows which also make
trade policies effective on the macroeconomic level. The
clearest examples of this are trade credits tied to the
purchase of goods. For example, if the importation of
capital goods is reduced (by an increase in tariffs)
this will at the same time reduce the inflow of for-
eign capital to finance such transactions (thus deacti-
vating the currency appreciation pressures that would
arise in the case of the neoclassical models analysed
earlier). Likewise, an export subsidy accompanied by
the export of capital (incorporated in trade credits or
foreign direct investments, for example) will also
have an effective impact on the trade balance.
It could be argued that in this latter case the re-
sult would be to alter the trade balance but not the
balance of payments as a whole (since the real and
financial movements would cancel each other out),
so that the macroeconomic effects would be in-
significant.
However, this compensation between the trade
account and the capital account becomes particularly
significant when the international financial agents
view exports and the trade balance as decisive factors
in their expectations regarding the ability of highly
indebted economies to meet their external commit-
ments. In other words, these variables become influ-
ential indicators used by the agents when analysing
the external sustainability of economic stabilization
and structural reform programmes. In this sense, it
can be maintained that the shadow price of each
dollar entering through the trade account is higher
than that of a dollar entering through the capital ac-
count.
Export subsidies may be justified on different
grounds in the microeconomic and the macroeco-
nomic spheres.12 In the second case, trade policy acts
as a second-best instrument for correcting general
problems of relative prices, so that any kind of
sectoral selectivity should be avoided. In the first
case, in contrast, trade policy acts as a first- or
second-order instrument for correcting micro-
economic distortions. The resource allocation effects
of the policy are therefore important, and it should
have a degree of selectivity determined by the partic-
ular objectives of each measure.
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10 The activist derivations of the new theory have been the sub-
ject of heavy criticism. Grossman (1987) sums up the main
shortcomings in the argument, including its lack of robustness
(in the event of marginal changes in the assumptions), its failure
to include the possibility of trade reprisals, the information
problems implicit in policy implementation, and the serious
problems of political economy raised by such discretional forms
of intervention.
11 See Krueger (1990) and, for a local version, Rodríguez
(1994).
12 A second area of interaction between the microeconomic and
macroeconomic aspects implicit in the use of export subsidies
is connected with their fiscal effects in contexts of fiscal con-
straint. This issue has been analysed in Sirlin (1997a).
3. Supply-side or integral industrial policy
approaches
In the previous two sections we set forth the theoreti-
cal arguments justifying the use of export subsidies
as industrial policy instruments or as a complement
to macroeconomic policy.
But what is the right level for the incentives?
Should they be accompanied by some specific com-
mitment on the part of the private agents, to be su-
pervised by the government? Should the incentives
provided be supplemented with other types of poli-
cies? The answers to these questions will be very dif-
ferent, depending on the theoretical conception the
authorities have of the functioning of the economy
and, hence, of the role to be played by industrial pol-
icy. In this respect, we consider it necessary to distin-
guish between two main concepts of industrial
policy, which we may call the supply-side and inte-
gral approaches (table 1).
In the first approach, which is well represented
by the second-best theory and the new international
trade theory, the private agents are assumed to be
perfectly rational and the problem stems from the er-
roneous price signals they receive. If these are cor-
rected, the agents will spontaneously adjust their
decisions in such a way as to achieve socially opti-
mal results.
If the system of incentives is well designed, the
question of the measures needed to ensure compli-
ance with them is no longer important: there is no
point in demanding a programme to increase exports
or demanding and supervising the production re-
structuring processes of the beneficiary firms,
because these results will be ensured by the maximiz-
ing response of the private agents themselves.
Under the other approach, which we have called
the integral approach, the answers to the questions
asked at the beginning of this section are signifi-
cantly different. This approach is based on different
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TABLE 1
Alternative industrial policy approaches
Supply-side Integral
Critical assumptions Neoclassical micro-bases: entrepreneurs
respond spontaneously to changes in
price signals.
Transaction costs do not exist.
Evolutionist micro-bases: entrepreneurs may
be incapable of perceiving, processing and re-
sponding to changes in price signals.
Transaction costs do exist.
Importance of the institutional framework.
Problems observed which
justify intervention
Price signals distorted by market flaws
and policy-derived distortions.
Distorted price signals, plus:
Failures of coordination due to transaction
costs.
Limited entrepreneurial capacity.
Need to modify socially inefficient patterns
of microeconomic behaviour.
Types of policies applied Modification of price signals. Modification of price signals, plus:
Binding commitments required in return for
the incentives provided.
Industrial extension activities designed to
strengthen entrepreneurs’ decision-making
capacity and to promote coordinated solu-
tions within the framework of collective
conversion processes.
Institutional requirements Low institutional requirements (design,
application and auditing of supply-side
policies).
High institutional requirements:
Greater importance attached to controls in
order to reduce transaction costs.
Public and mixed institutions linked up with
production networks.
Source: Sirlin (1997b).
micro-bases according to which entrepreneurs have
only limited rationality and may therefore have diffi-
culty in perceiving, assimilating and responding to
changes in price signals. There is no longer a situa-
tion of global and absolute maximization, but rather
one of local maximization in which the agents tend to
take decisions that improve their situation but do not
necessarily take the fullest advantage of all the possi-
ble alternatives.
Among the consequences of this change of as-
sumptions are the following:
i) It may prove to be necessary to exaggerate the
incentives in order to indicate more clearly the types
of responses it is desired to induce.13 In the case un-
der discussion this would mean, for example, gener-
ating a positive bias in favour of exports and not
merely eliminating the anti-export bias.
ii) The local maximization measures taken by
entrepreneurs may not coincide with the socially
optimal reactions which it was desired to induce
through the policy. An incentive like that provided by
the ISR, for example, may be used to obtain windfall
rents in the export market rather than to finance a
production restructuring process that would structur-
ally strengthen firms’ export capacity. Requirements
for export and investment commitments and suitable
supervision of their fulfilment may prove to be es-
sential in order to achieve the policy objectives.14
iii) Entrepreneurs may have difficulty in carry-
ing out the changes promoted by the public sector in-
centives. This difficulty may stem either from the
existence of other price distortions (capital market flaws,
for example) or from shortcomings in terms of the ca-
pabilities and knowledge needed in order to carry out
the restructuring process. Supplementing changes in
the price signals with other policies that strengthen
entrepreneurs’ response capacity may be the key to
the success of the incentive systems applied.
In an integral approach, the institutional require-
ments increase considerably, especially with regard





1. Description of the Regime
The ISR operates as follows:
Enterprises conclude agreements with the Minis-
try of Industry on (annual or multi-year) schedules
for increasing their exports of specific industrial
products. Each enterprise may submit more than one
programme and include various products in each of
them.
In all cases the base year is 1992. The value of
the exports is net of imported components.
The enterprises become eligible for tariff rebate
certificates, in an amount equivalent to the increase
in their exports, which allow them to import goods at
a differential tariff of 2% and a “statistical rate” of
3%.15 As from 1997, a gradual process of reduction
of incentives was begun, designed to bring them in
line with the prevailing tariffs by the year 2000.
The commitments entered into are not binding,
and the enterprises receive incentives for the total
amount of their increase in exports, regardless of
whether this is lower, equal to, or higher than the
amount promised. Moreover, enterprises can refrain
from applying for incentive payments in years when
they do not make more exports than in the base year,
but can apply for them again in subsequent years
when they do comply with this condition.
Enterprises can import at differential tariffs
products which correspond to the same production
sector as the goods they export and are in the same
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13 Such clearer indications take on greater importance in con-
texts of great uncertainty, since they provide information on the
course the authorities want the transformation process to take.
14 This is so if industrial policy is seen as a mechanism for in-
ducing entrepreneurs to take social efficient decisions rather
than merely as a means of providing them with extra benefits.
15 At the time when the ISR was established the “statistical
rate” had been raised from 3% to 10% for most products.
chapter of the foreign trade nomenclature. Likewise,
in programmes involving complex goods that can be
broken down into various components, they can in-
clude imports of the same type of goods or of their
component parts or assemblies. When programmes
involve the export of parts and components, the im-
ports can include complex goods incorporating such
components.
When complex goods are exported it is neces-
sary to comply with an additional requirement: the
product exported must contain a minimum of 25% of
inputs or parts obtained from an independent sup-
plier (the original decree laid down that these suppli-
ers must be local firms, but this requirement
disappeared as a result of a later amendment).
In all cases firms must seek the approval of the
relevant chambers of industry for the goods to be im-
ported. The key criterion for granting such approval
is the possibility of damage to local producers of
such goods, if they exist. In some cases, through the
mediation of the Ministry of Industry, compromise
agreements were reached on the amounts, prices and
destinations of the imported goods.16
The benefits provided by the ISR are in addition
to those available under the systems of drawbacks
and exemption and repayment of the value added tax
on exports. Adding together the average levels of
drawbacks and tariff reductions under the ISR
programmes, the total incentive per unit of additional
exports came to over 30% (i.e., 13% for the average
drawback on exports plus 18% for the average tariff
reductions). This total indicates the existence of a
bias in favour of exports, since the taxes and extra
costs borne by export activities hardly came to such a
large amount.
2. The ISR as an incentive for production
restructuring and an export incentive
Towards the beginning of the 1990s there was
generalized agreement on the microeconomic short-
comings of Argentine industry: technological back-
wardness, small scales of production, excessive
diversification of production, and insufficient
development of inter-firm networks (especially for
subcontracting).17
The Cavallo administration tried to address these
problems from the start by reducing what it saw as
one of their main causes: the anti-export bias. Tariff
reductions, the elimination of distortive taxes, eco-
nomic deregulation, making export drawbacks equal
to import tariffs, and the reintroduction of temporary
duty-free admission were the main measures adopted
in this respect.
The Industrial Specialization Regime (ISR) was
presented as a natural extension of this strategy and
an effective instrument for promoting restructuring
through production specialization. It was acknowl-
edged that the ISR could not of itself transform the
Argentine production structure, but it was considered
that it could “give rise to valid models of business
conduct that should be followed by the rest of the
industrial community” (Magariños, Díaz Pérez and
Sierra, 1995).
But how was it intended to set this process in
motion?
On the one hand, the authorities had eliminated
–and even reversed– the anti-export bias which was
seen as one of the structural factors responsible for
the excessive diversification of production. On the
other hand, it was believed that the ISR would enable
entrepreneurs to capture trading rents (by extracting
them from distributors of imported products) which
would be used to finance the necessary investment
and restructuring processes.
The design of the ISR reflected some aspects of
the “integral” industrial policy approach mentioned
earlier: the desire to “signpost” the transformation
process, and the provision of somewhat exaggerated
incentives (which, as noted in the previous section,
were bigger than any possible anti-export bias).
As an incentive for restructuring, however, the
ISR was basically a biased, supply-side instrument.
i) No commitment to make investments or mod-
ify the product structure was demanded (this repre-
sented a crucial difference from the Automotive
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16 The consultations with the Chambers of Industry were not
binding, however, since they did not include the previous stages
(because of the problem of substitution of inputs). Private
sources claim that the results depended on the relative strengths
of the negotiating parties and that there have been cases of
programmes that have been approved despite their rejection by
the Chambers (Interview with F. Martínez, representative of the
Textile Industries Association).
17 Significant contributions to the establishment of this general
consensus were made by the studies carried out in the ECLAC
Buenos Aires Office by J. Katz and B. Kosacoff. A summary of
these studies is given in Katz, 1993.
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Regime). On the contrary, it was simply assumed
that firms would “maximize” their activities, using
the rents generated by the ISR to optimize their pro-
duction.
ii) There was no requirement that the items to be
imported by firms should have effectively formed
part of their product structure before, so that produc-
tion specialization could be carried out at the ex-
pense of local subcontractors. Furthermore, firms
could obtain benefits by exporting all the goods they
produced earlier or, still worse, by exporting one set
of goods in one year and a different set of products in
another (provided they were registered in different
programmes of the same firm). In neither case was
production specialization a necessary requirement
for fulfilling the conditions for the receipt of incen-
tives.
iii) The ISR was not accompanied by other in-
struments, specially aimed at small and me-
dium-sized firms, which would help to facilitate and
materialize the restructuring processes that it was de-
sired to induce. Thus, the main beneficiaries of the
ISR were big companies whose process of production
restructuring and insertion in the international market
was already consolidated and did not need this kind
of incentives. This shortcoming was detected by an
early appraisal study by the Ministry of Industry it-
self which noted the need to establish a programme
of ongoing attention to the needs of small and me-
dium-sized firms in order to promote their inclusion
in the ISR, linked up with the promotional activities
of the Fundación ExportAr and the Banco de
Inversión y Comercio Exterior (Argentina, Dirección
de Estudios Industriales, 1994). These recommenda-
tions did not result in any solution for the problem,
however.
iv) Scant attention was paid to the institutional
facilities needed for spreading (especially among
small and medium-sized firms), managing and super-
vising the ISR. For example, some of its requirements
(such as obtaining at least 25% of the parts and com-
ponents from independent suppliers) were simply not
supervised at all.18
The ISR was applied as a fiscal incentive for ex-
ports rather than as a conversion policy. Towards the
end of 1992 the simultaneous processes of exchange
rate appreciation and the boom in consumption gave
rise to a rapidly growing trade deficit. For this rea-
son, the government embarked on a strategy to cor-
rect relative prices by fiscal means, one of the main
instruments of which was an increase in export draw-
backs. The ISR was just one of the mechanisms in
this strategy.
In its role as an export incentive, however, the
ISR also displays a supply-side approach, with severe
design flaws:
i) The export commitments were not binding. In
reality, they served no real purpose at all.19
ii) For firms with more than one approved
programme it was perfectly possible to receive bene-
fits even without increasing their total exports.20
iii) Firms could apply for incentive payments in
the years when they exceeded the exports of the base
year but were not subject to any penalty in respect of
the years when they did not meet their commitments.
Thus, the Regime rewarded not only genuine export
efforts but also good results of a purely conjunctural
nature.21
iv) The fixed base year 1992 gave rise to some
undesirable biases. It penalized firms which had al-
ready made a substantial export effort (even at a loss)
in that year. Furthermore, it gave bigger rewards to
firms which registered a spectacular but once-only
increase (since they received the same incentive for
all the years of the programme) than firms which
made a sustained export effort and increased their ex-
ports year by year. This problem could have been
solved by using a movable base year.
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18 The shortage of institutional resources for implementing the
policy was also reflected in the lack of updated and accurate in-
formation on the functioning of the ISR. Furthermore, the weak-
ness of the supervisory arrangements may have permitted
fraudulent misuse of the Regime, such as the re-importation into
national territory of exports which had received benefits under
it.
19 In reality, except for their publicity value, the commitments
only served for the proportional payment of benefits during the
first year of each programme. As from the second year, the in-
centives were only granted on the basis of the exports in the
base year, in respect of the amount of additional exports (re-
gardless of whether these were less, equal to, or greater than the
figures stated in the commitments.
20 Take, for example, a firm that submits two programmes for
products A and B, of which it exported $ 50 in each case in the
base year (i.e., a total of $ 100). If in the following year this
firm exports $ 60 of product A and $ 0 of product B, it can nev-
ertheless claim benefits of $ 10 (in respect of the programme for
product A), even though its total exports have gone down by $
40.
21 Moreover, firms can inflate their export results for one year at
the expense of another by altering the billing dates.
v) Firms could submit their programmes after
having begun or increased their exports.
vi) Tariffs were not reduced in proportion to the
existing import duties but were all reduced to the
same amount of 2%. Thus, the higher the original
tariff on the goods to be imported, the greater the in-
centive, and in the Argentine tariff system the highest
tariffs tend to correspond to goods with the highest
degree of processing.
The foregoing means that in many cases the ISR
operated as a superfluous reward for those who had
made a sporadic increase in their exports rather than
as an incentive to make greater export efforts.In view
of its various design flaws, there are grounds for pre-
suming that many of the increases in exports under
the ISR programmes would have been made in any
case, even without the incentives of the Regime in
question.
IV
The impact of the Industrial
Specialization Regime (ISR)
When it was suspended, in August 1996, the ISR had
over 300 approved programmes, of which some 190
had already resulted in the issue of tariff rebate cer-
tificates. The increase in exports in the period from
1993 to 1995 came to US$ 440 million, so that with
an average tariff preference of 18%22 the presumed
fiscal cost came to some US$ 80 million.
As already noted, the ISR only acts as a very in-
direct incentive for industrial conversion and pro-
duction specialization. The absence of binding
commitments by the beneficiary firms makes it more
difficult to verify possible microeconomic changes
due to the ISR.
In a survey made by the Ministry of Industry in
the first half of 1996, three years after the initiation
of the ISR, it was found that 87% of firms had made
investments after their inclusion in the ISR, and that
most of those investments were for re-equipment.
A large proportion of the firms (61%) made changes
in their process and organizational engineering,
while 48% increased their scale of production. A
similar percentage of the firms intensified their qual-
ity control activities in view of the new demands
posed by external markets, while 35% said that they
had carried out processes implying a tendency to-
wards greater specialization and 39% reported spe-
cialization towards more complex products or goods
with greater added value (Argentina, Secretaría de
Industria y Comercio Exterior, 1996).
These results do not allow us to come to any im-
portant conclusion, however. In the period from 1992
to 1996 there was a generalized process of invest-
ment and re-equipment in Argentine industry, to-
gether with changes in process and organizational
engineering and increases in scale of production (as
witness the increase in the global levels of industrial
activity). Furthermore, the 35% of firms which
tended to specialize is only a modest figure for a Re-
gime which was explicitly designed to promote pro-
duction specialization. In no case was it possible to
determine the type of causality between the micro-
economic behaviour of firms and their inclusion in
the ISR.
Independently of the various criticisms levelled
at the ISR as an industrial policy instrument, a con-
sensus has tended to grow up on its effectiveness as a
means of promoting exports of manufactures, thanks
partly to the massive publicity that the Ministry of
Industry has made of its results. It has also been
claimed that the increases in exports have been greater
than those promised in the commitments (table 2).
The information proffered by the Ministry of In-
dustry highlights the fact that, since the initiation of
the ISR, US$ 430 million of exports were generated
between 1993 and 1995. However, this information
is hardly a reflection of the relative results of the
firms registered under the ISR. It would therefore be
desirable to compare the growth rates of exports un-
der the ISR with those for the rest of manufactures.
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seven points in the “statistical rate”. As from 1995, when the
“statistical rate” went back to its original level of 3%, the mar-
gin of preference under the ISR went down proportionately.
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Table 3 shows that the growth rate of exports un-
der the ISR programmes was almost equal to that of
industrial manufactures as a whole in 1993, much
higher in 1994 and much lower in 1995.23 If we de-
duct from exports of manufactures of industrial ori-
gin those corresponding to the motor industry (which
has a special Regime of its own) and gold and manu-
factures thereof (which were inflated by a
multi-million dollar fraud against the State), the pic-
ture changes and the growth of exports under the ISR
in 1993 and 1994 becomes rather more marked. Even
so, however, if we take the average for the period
from 1993 to 1995 the results for those exports are
below those of industrial manufactures as a whole
(excluding the motor industry and gold).24
The appraisal of the ISR’s results is much more
unfavourable if one bears in mind that the official
figures on export increases under that Regime only
take account of the external sales of the firms which
applied for tariff rebate certificates in each year. In
other words, they only take account of the firms
which had exports greater than those of the base year
1992 and were therefore able to apply for benefits
under the Regime. In contrast, they fail to include the
firms that did not receive benefits in each year, pre-
sumably because they did not reach the goal of ex-
ceeding the level of exports of the base year.25
Unfortunately no information is available on the ex-
port performance of firms which are registered in the
ISR but did not submit applications for benefits in
each year.
An indirect idea of the proportion of
programmes which did not become eligible for bene-
fits in each year is given by the ratio between the ini-
tial level of exports of the programmes which
received benefits and the initial level of exports of all
the programmes presenting commitments for each
year. This ratio was 72% for 1993, only 24% for
1994, and 48% for 1995.
This information indicates that a large propor-
tion of the programmes (estimated on the basis of
their share of initial exports) were not able to receive
benefits. The proportion is very high for 1994, which
was precisely the year when the ISR was supposed to
be at its most dynamic. The erratic levels of submis-
sion of applications for benefits tend to confirm the
hypothesis that the ISR has rewarded sporadic export
results rather than systematic export efforts.
Some special comments are called for on the
distribution of ISR programmes by sector, geograph-
ical area and company size. From the sectoral point
of view, the most prominent sectors are iron and
steel, with 27% of the increase in exports; tyres,
15%; chemicals and auto parts, 9% each; and foot-
wear, 7% (Bermúdez, 1996). Still greater concentra-
tion is to be seen in the geographical origin of these
exports: Buenos Aires accounts for 64%, Santa Fe
for 12%, and the Federal Capital for 7%.
With regard to the breakdown by company size,
57% of the firms which received tariff rebate certifi-
cates were small or medium-sized enterprises, many
of which embarked on export activities for the first
time under the ISR. They have displayed greater dy-
namism than the big companies registered under the
Regime, though this is partly explained by the low
level of their initial exports. Their share of total addi-
tional exports only came to 15%, however, which in-
dicates that the ISR was mainly an industrial policy
instrument for large firms.
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TABLE 2
Argentina: Exports of the programmes which obtained
tariff rebate certificates each year under the
Industrial Specialization Regime (ISR)
(Millions of dollars)
Exports 1993 1994 1995
In base year 1992 389.8 163.2 337.5
Annual total 492.0 344.7 508.5
Annual increase 92.3 172.0 175.9
Exports under ISR/
All exports of manufac-
tures of industrial origin 13.4% 7.4% 7.8%
Source: Argentina, Secretaría de Industria y Comercio Exterior
(1996).
23 The valid point of reference would be manufactures of indus-
trial origin rather than total manufactures, since the sectoral pro-
file of the ISR programmes shows a relatively low proportion of
manufactures of agricultural origin.
24 Because of the inadequacy and tardiness of the official data
on exports under the ISR, an influential study by Cepeda (1995)
overestimates the contribution of the ISR to the growth of in-
dustrial exports in 1994. The indirect estimates made by that au-
thor suggested that the ISR was responsible for 20% of the
growth of exports of manufactures of industrial origin between
1993 and 1994, but the definitive information available indi-
cates that the share attributable to the ISR was only around
10%, both between 1992 and 1993 and between 1992 and 1994.
25 This takes away the validity of the assertion that the export
commitments were surpassed, since it only refers to this limited
and biased set of programmes.
V
Conclusions
The Industrial Specialization Regime formed part of
a small group of active policies implemented from
1993 on in order to cope with the strong pressures
being exerted by the growing trade deficit and the
difficulties firms were facing in their efforts to carry
out production and technological restructuring pro-
cesses.
The inadequacy of the incentives offered, their
lack of linkages with the other industrial policy in-
struments, and the failure to demand binding produc-
tion conversion commitments militated against the
efficacy of the ISR as an instrument for promoting re-
structuring.
Nor does the Regime seem to have func-
tioned properly as an export incentive, since the
dynamism of exports under the ISR programmes
was less than that of the rest of exports of man-
ufactures of industrial origin. Furthermore, be-
cause of various features of the design of the
ISR, a substantial part of the benefits provided
under it went to sporadically good export re-
sults rather than sustained export efforts.
It may be concluded that, in general, the benefits
granted have been redundant in the sense that they
have rewarded exports that would have been made in
any case and have not stimulated a significant addi-
tional export flow. The main beneficiaries have been
big companies with a long export tradition (notably
iron and steel companies).
Finally, the Argentine experience with the Indus-
trial Specialization Regime shows the limitations of
the supply-side approach to industrial policy. This
case shows how the theoretical biases of orthodox
thinking have not only helped to determine the course
taken by structural reforms but have also had a negative
influence on the ways in which industrial policy instru-
ments have been designed and applied. In particular,
nothing was done to ensure the necessary strengthening
of the public bodies responsible for policy design, imple-
mentation, supervision and evaluation, which appears to
be one of the main reasons why the new industrial
policies continue to display the same defects as those
of the import substitution period.
(Original: Spanish)
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TABLE 3
Argentina: Growth of total exports of manufactures
and of those which have received tariff rebate certificates
under the Industrial Specialization Regime (ISR)
(Percentages)
Exports of manufactures 1993-1992 1994-1992 1995-1992 Average1993-1995/1992
With tariff rebate certificates under ISR 26 110 51 49
Of industrial origin 29 61 126 72
Of industrial origin, with exception of
motor industry and gold a 17 34 105 56
Source: For data on the ISR: Argentina, Secretaría de Industria y Comercio Exterior (1996); for exports of manufactures: prepared by the
author on the basis of data from the Institute of Statistics and Censuses.
a The categories excluded were SITC, Rev. 2 groups 781, 782 and 784 (motor vehicles and parts) and groups 772 and 897 (electrical appa-
ratus for making and breaking electrical circuits, etc., and jewellery and goldsmiths’ wares).
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